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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 981675-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

BLAKE D. PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1998).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that reasonable suspicion existed to

execute a level two stop and detention of Peterson? "A trial court's determination of
reasonable articulable suspicion is a conclusion of law reviewed for correctness....
Appellate courts, however, afford the trial judge 'a measure of discretion' in applying
the reasonable articulable suspicion standard to a particular set of facts." State v.
Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
1

This issue was preserved in a pre-trial Motion to Suppress (R. 47-58, 103-06).
2.

Whether the stop and detention of Peterson were justified pursuant to the

"community caretaker functions" of law enforcement personnel? This Court should
review the trial court's findings of fact for "clear error" and the trial court's legal
conclusions for "correctness." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App.
1992) (citations omitted).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Blake Peterson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment imposed
by the Honorable Ray M. Harding after the denial of his motion to suppress evidence
and the entrance of a conditional plea to Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third
degree felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

2

On May 10, 1996, Peterson was charged by information with Possession of
Methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section
SS^-S^XaXi). 1 On September 20, 1996, a preliminary hearing was conducted and
after a finding of probable cause, Peterson was subsequentiy arraigned on the charges
(R. 21, 147).
On January 21, 1997, Peterson filed with the trial court a motion to suppress
evidence under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution on the grounds
that he had been illegally seized and searched (R. 47-58). The trial court by signed
memorandum decision issued on February 28, 1997, denied Peterson's motion (R. 108112).
On March 5, 1997, Peterson entered a plea to Possession of Methamphetamine,
a third degree felony, conditioned upon his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress (R. 113-118, 121-124). On September 18, 1998, Peterson was
sentened to three years probation (R. 138-40). On October 16, 1998, Peterson filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District Court and this action commenced (R. 142).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

*Peterson was also charged with three misdemeanors which were subsequendy
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.
3

Ai approximately 4:00 p.m. on April 19, 1996, Deputies Harold Curtis and
David Knowles of the Utah County Sheriffs Department were patrolling the area of
Archery Road near Squaw Peak in separate vehicles (Tr. at 4, 5). Shordy thereafter,
the officers received a call from dispatch regarding a person known to frequent the
Squaw Peak area who might be "suicidal" and driving a blue Ford Tempo (Tr. at 5,
14).
The officers began to ascend Squaw Peak via Archery Road. On the first pull
out to the east of Archery Road, Knowles spotted a blue Dodge (Tr. at 5, 15).
Knowles then radioed Curtis who was directly behind him and the two vehicles pulled
into the pull-out (Tr. at 5-6). Peterson was seated in the driver's seat of the blue
vehicle (Tr. at 12); and several other people were visible within the vehicle (Tr. at 7,
11-12).
Knowles testified that as he was pulling behind the vehicle and "making a stop",
he observed Peterson "making furtive movements" with his left hand at the bottom of
his seat and then Peterson exited the vehicle and threw a metallic object into a wooded
area (Tr. at 6, 16). Knowles testified that when he pulled behind the Dodge, his
vehicle blocked the only exit (Tr. at 16, 26).
Curtis also observed the thrown object (Tr. at 7). Curtis then got out of his
vehicle, hand-cuffed Peterson, and then searched the wooded area for the thrown object
while Knowles approaced the Dodge (Tr. at 7, 17). Curtis subsequently located a
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warm marijuana pipe (Tr. at 7). Knowles also testified that "at [this] point we were
uncertain if the vehicle that we had was the suspect vehicle" but that the vehicle's
occupants "were acting suspicious, making furtive movements" (Tr. at 10).
After approaching the vehicle, Knowles asked the individuals inside the vehicle
to place their hands where he could see them (Tr. at 10). Knowles testified that when
the occupants raised their arms, Knowles observed an open container in the rear of the
vehicle between the passenger seats (Id.). Knowles then had the occupants exit the
vehicle and as he removed the open container he smelled a strong odor of marijuana in
the vehicle (Id.). Knowles then searched the vehicle without the consent of the
occupants and found zig-zag rolling papers and a rectangular piece of paper containing
methamphetamine in the driver's side door (Tr. at 10-11, 20). Peterson later told the
officers that the vehicle belonged to his parents (Tr. at 21).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Peterson asserts that the deputies from the Utah County Sheriffs Office lacked
reasonable suspicion to justify the level two stop and detention executed in this case.
Peterson argues further that the illegality of the stop cannot be overcome under a
"community caretaker" standard. Accordingly, the evidence obtained from the
detention of Peterson and the search of his vehicle should have been suppressed.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT REASONABLE
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION EXISTED TO JUSTIFY THE LEVEL
TWO STOP AND DETENTION OF PETERSON
Utah courts have acknowledged three categories of constitutionally permissible
encounters between citizens and law enforcement personnel:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions
so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being
committed."
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). The distinction between a level one and level two encounter is whether if, "in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave" State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah
App. 1997) (quoting United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
In this case the trial court concluded that the encounter between Peterson and the
officers became a level two stop "at some point" (R. 111). However, the trial court
concluded that the officers' detention of Peterson was justified by "reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity" (R. 110).

6

In regards to the level of suspicion necessary to effectuate a level two stop and
detention
a police officer must "point to specific and articulable facts which, together with
rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to
conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime." The
assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective standard based
on the totality of the circumstances. . ."
Struhs, 940 P.2d at 1228 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 8889) (emphases added). The trial court concluded that Peterson's "furtive movement"
of reaching under his seat "coupled with the attempt to conceal the metallic object by
throwing it into the woods" created a reasonable, articulate suspicion of criminal
activity under the totality of circumstances which authorized the deputies to further
detain Peterson and the other occupants for subsequent investigation (R. 110).
However, Peterson asserts that the deputies under the totality of circumstances
could not point to "specific and articulable facts" which would lead a reasonable person
to believe, that Peterson or the other occupants had committed—or were about to
commit—a crime. First and foremost, the deputies, stopped the wrong vehicle. The
information received by the deputies from dispatch concerned a blue Ford Tempo (Tr.
at 5, 14). However, the vehicle driven by Peterson was a blue Dodge (Tr. at 5, 15).
Second, the information received by dispatch concerned a suicidal "individual" while
Peterson was with at least three other individuals (Tr. at 7, 11-12). The road which
leads up to Squaw Peak is narrow and windy, and it is bordered by numerous pull outs
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which are themselves practically invisible until a driver is almost completely beside
one. At the point in which the officers saw Peterson's vehicle, they must have been
close enough to realize that they had the wrong type of car and, quite simply, the
wrong number of suspects.
The trial court in reaching his conclusion of "reasonable suspicion" ignored
these facts and focused only upon Peterson's solitary "furtive movement" and his
throwing an object into the woods. A furtive movement by itself is insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion. See, State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 511 (Utah App.
1989). Moreover, Peterson could have been doing any number of things when he
made the alleged "furtive movement"—retrieving car keys from the floor boards, tying
his shoes, reaching for his wallet, etc.; and he could have been throwing any number of
items into the woods.
Accordingly, Peterson requests, in light of the true totality of circumstances
surrounding the encounter between the deputies and the vehicle occupants, that this
Court "correct" the trial court's conclusion of "reasonable suspicion" and hold that the
evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional detention of Peterson and the
subsequent search of his vehicle must be suppressed.

8

POINT n
THE ILLEGAL DETENTION OF PETERSON CANNOT
BE JUSTIFIED UNDER A "COMMUNITY CARETAKER" STANDARD
The trial court concluded in the alternative that the stop and detention of
Peterson was justified under a "community caretaker" function of law enforcement
personnel.
In Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360 (Ut. App. 1992), the Utah Court of
Appeals outiined a three-pronged test whereby courts may analyze the legitimacy of
"community caretaker" stops. In Warden, a tip to a police officer revealed that an
individual in the vicinity was intending to overdose on cocaine. The officer was
supplied with a full description of the vehicle and the license plate number, together
with information regarding the approximate location of the car. The officer located a
car with a matching description and plate number and pulled the driver over. This stop
was effectuated, however, with no evidence that a crime was being, or was about to be,
committed; nor was there a reasonable suspicion that such activity was afoot. After
making the stop, the officer could smell alcohol on the defendant's breath. After field
tests revealed that defendant was intoxicated, he was charged and convicted of driving
under the influence. Id. at 361.
The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the stop amounted to an
illegal seizure and the evidence used against him should be suppressed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the officer conducted a valid community
9

caretaker stop which was not violative of the fourth amendment. The Warden court
applied the following test to the facts when reviewing the trial court:
First, did a seizure occur under the Fourth Amendment definition of that
term? Second, based upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in
pursuit of a bona fide caretaker function — under the given
circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a
purpose consistent with community caretaker functions? Third, based
upon an objective analysis, did the circumstances demonstrate an
imminent danger to life or limb.
Id. At 364 (emphasis added).
Peterson asserts that an application of the Warden test cannot support the stop in
the case at bar. Appellant submits that, although the first and third prongs are met, the
stop at Squaw Peak fails the test under the second prong, as a reasonable officer under
the given circumstances would not have stopped Peterson's vehicle. For mainly the
reasons stated above, the deputies should have known from the outset that they were
investigating the wrong car and the wrong people. The incident occurred at
approximately 4:00 p.m. in April, so there was certainly enough light for the deputies
to realize that they had not yet found a blue Dodge carrying a lone, suicidal individual.
These points emphasize an important factual distinction from Warden, where the seized
car matched not only the description but also the license plate number of the suspect
vehicle.
Peterson submits that a reasonable officer confronted with the facts of the case at
bar would not have detained his vehicle. Therefore, the stop cannot be justified under

10

the community caretaker rule as oudined in Warden. Accordingly, Peterson asks that
this Court hold that the "community caretaker" standard cannot cure the illegal
detention of Peterson and unconstitutional search of his vehicle.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Peterson asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and to remand the case to the Fourth District Court with instructions that his
plea may be withdrawn and that the evidence should be suppressed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this # 1 day of April, 1999.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Margaret
Counsel for Peterson

y

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief to the Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor,
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this^Y day of April, 1999.
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Ut,--.h_Ccurity. Staiu oJ Utah

3-3-V

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

C A S E !"'

" M IIKJ/J.II

vs.

DATF .-ebruary 28, H>97

BLAKE PETERSON,

Ji
Defendant.

IHTL

RAY M. HARDING

) \ \\ CLERK: Christine Gerhart
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

I his i i lat I: 5 11: came befoi e the C :>i 11 1: 1 ip c 1 1 Defendai it's I"1 lotion to Suppress. Having
received and considered the Motion, together with m e m o r a n d a in support o f and opposition to
the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum
Decision.

Statemc nit c f F acts
at approximately 4:00pm, Deputies Harold Curtis and David
Knowles of the Utah County Sheriffs Office received a report of a suicidal person, possibly
armed with a gun, driving a blue Ford Tempo who may be in the Squaw Peak area. As
Deputies Curtis and Knowles drove up Archery Road looking for the vehicle, they spotted a
blue vehicle parked

; off of the road.
I! I I

..;-..

- ^ ^

looking 10:

1 I 1 I I I I I I III Hi

I I I , III I I I I III II II I III III II ILS

VVttS

till*

\ t;c pui . . .,,) behind the blue car, he saw the Defendant get

• >.,: o! the car and throw a shiny, metallic object into the woods. Deputy Curtis, pulling in
behind Deputy Knowles also saw the occupant of the car throw the object, then saw the other
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occupants begin to exit the car. He ordered them back into the vehicle, then approached the
vehicle and asked the Defendant what he had thrown into the woods. The Defendant denied
throwing anything, so Deputy Curtis went to search in the area he had seen the object thrown
while Deputy Knowles approached the car to secure the rest of the occupants while the
Deputies were conducting their investigation.
Deputy Knowles observed an open container of beer in the car and ordered the
occupants out of the car. As he was retrieving the open container of beer, he noticed the
smell of marijuana inside the car. Deputy Knowles searched the car and found
methamphetamine folded inside a "Camel Buck" along with zig zag papers inside the driver's
side door pocket. Deputy Curtis located a marijuana pipe from the area where he saw the
Defendant throw the object. The pipe was still warm, was not wet or covered with dirt, and
had marijuana residue inside the bowl.

Opinion of the Court
I.

THE DEPUTIES HAD A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO
EXECUTE A LEVEL TWO STOP AND TEMPORARILY DETAIN THE
DEFENDANT.
The Defendant argues that when Deputy Knowles pulled in and blocked the exit

with his vehicle that at that point the Defendant was seized and entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections. The Defendant relies on State v. Smith 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) to claim
that a level two stop occurred without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
and that the facts in this case are entirely distinguishable from those in State v. Jackson 805
P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1990), where the court found a seizure had not occurred.
The Court agrees that at some point, a level two stop of the Defendant occurred and
he was seized. The Court disagrees with the Defendant, however, as to when the stop
occurred.

The facts in this case seem to fall somewhere in between Smith and Jackson.

Deputy Knowles testified that as he was pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle, stopping
2
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his vehicle and calling in the stop, he saw the Defendant reach underneath his seat, exit the
car and throv A ni.;+uj
"PHI

» ( i c ; into the woo^N <Preliminary H-anng Irai.^ii, ;. i.^ci.uJur

.. „.

••

u

*-•

- Smmi did,* h<n\e\e: tin Defendant

did not approach Deputy Knowles and initiate the contact as the defendant in Jackson did.
The Defendant clearly did notJfeeLiom^

the mere presence of the deputy's

vehicle behind him, since he got out and threw something into the woods. It was only after
he had thrown the object that his freedomjvas restrained.jgjhe deputies.
The Defendant's car was already stopped in the pull-out when th
approached and he > a s clearl> fi ee to move around, similar to the defendant in Jackson, ,.' a*
768. The Defendant did not voluntarily approach the deputies and initiate the contact, but
that is only because before he could do so, he threw the pipe into the woods, an act which
created a reasonable suspicion in the deputies' minds of criminal activity.
The furtive movements alone of the Defendant do not provide a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. However, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances,jtlie^
furtive movements coupled with the attempt to conceal the metallic object by thi^wngj^into
the woods does create a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity authorizing the
deputies to temporarily detain the Defendant while they investigated. Since these actions
occurred prior to, or contemporaneously with Deputy Knowles blocking the exit to the pullout with his vehicle, jhe CoyrJLjfindsjthat^^

the Defendant was

appropriate. Once the deputie had looat \i the marijuana pipe in the woods, in addition to
viewing the open c r+ - *

-

<. \enicit* * *.-•. iiaa ieasonable suspicion sufficient

to justify searching the car without a warrant.

THE STOP IS JUSTIFIED IN THE ALTERNATIVE AS A COMMUNITY
CARETAKER STOP.
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The Deputies's original purpose in pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle was to
ascertain whether or not this was the vehicle possibly containing the suicidal individual.
From the roadway, Deputy Knowles saw the vehicle in the pullout was a blue sedan. He
pulled into the pull-out, behind the Defendant's car to investigate whether or not this was, in
fact, the blue Ford Tempo he was looking for.
The Defendant does not take issue with the first and third factors of the community
caretaker stop test as defined in Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1992).
However, the Defendant claims that the second factor, whether the police conduct was bona
fide community caretaker activity, has not been met. The Defendant bases his argument on
the fact that the car the deputies were looking for was a blue Ford Tempo, whereas his car is
a blue Dodge.
The Court finds the Defendant's argument unpersuasive. The area the deputies were
searching is heavily wooded and the Defendant's car was parked off of the main road on a
side road or "pull-out" which leads to a camping spot. Deputy Knowles testified that from
the main road all that he could see was that a blue passenger car was parked in the pull-out.
Because of the physical circumstances, he was not able to ascertain whether the car was a
Ford Tempo or not. His sole purpose in pulling in behind the Defendant's vehicle was to
determine the make and model of the car to see if it matched his description. Before he
could pull close enough behind the vehicle to make that determination, the Defendant pulled
something from underneath the seat, exited the vehicle and threw it into the woods.
The Court finds that Deputy's Knowles and Curtis were acting in a reasonable
manner when they pulled in behind the Defendant's vehicle. It is ludicrous to expect the
deputies to make a determination of whether or not this was the vehicle they were looking for
without pulling off of the main road and inspecting the blue vehicle they had spotted from the
road. Indeed, it would be unreasonable for them, suspecting that someone's life was in
imminent danger not to investigate. It is unclear from the record how specific the description
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of the vehicle they were looking for was, but it is evident to the Court that the Defendant's
vehicle has enough similar characteristics to lead the deputies to pull in behind the
Defendant's vehicle and investigate. Indeed the Court finds that the deputies, as the officer in
Warden we;».» n v ;
evidence •'>!:»•''
of the Defendant

... • •;::

.:,

1^ •>-* ronini! . 1 -•
Id. at 365

*

LM.M^r
;

-

A

UI,\.

.*;• :i.^ ob

acquisiti- :311c f

oJ the suspicious activities

Iherefbre, me Court finds that the second prong of the test was

met and the Defendant was seized pursuant to a reasonable community caretaker stop.

Order
The Defendant's 1:;. :...:. .
IIA IFI) •*

..

• -

BY THE COURT:

. HARDING, Jl^Xffi
cc:

Utah County Attorney
Utah County Public Defender
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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STATE

v,x U T A H ,
P 1 a 1111 i f f ,
: ase No. 9 614 0 0720

vs
I P IK IK III
Defendant•

Preliminary Hearing
utronically recorded
September 20, 1996
B E F O R E : THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, SR.
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge
APPEARANCES:
For the State:

CLAUDIA LAYCOCK
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street
Suite 2100
Provo
Utah 8 4 606

l''ur t he Defendant:

Transcribed

MICHAEL JEWELL
Utah County Public
40 South 100 West
Suite 200
P rovo, 1J t a h 8 4 6 01

by: Beverly Lowe

Defender

RPR/CSR/CCT

CENTER COURT REPORTING
P
0. BOX 17 8 6
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786
TELEPHONE:

(801)224-9847

FftED

•)&> i ~}^ Y

FEB

COURT C APPEALS V±

^

2
INDEX
W I T N E S S : DAVID KNOWLES
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: M S . LAYCOCK
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MS. LAYCOCK

PAGE
4
13
26

-oOoEXHIBITS
NUMBER
No. 1

DESCRIPTION
Bag with Marijuana Pipe
-oOo-

RECEIVED
9

II^J^J'J
I I I'-'uLi u m c a l l y

K U. I N G S

_C_JJ!

recorded

September

THE COURT: Okay,

" ~ ~r )

~~

li State versus

Peterson

3:
, . MR, JEWELL: Oh
j$&m Laycock

' 7 case,

j c xz

UNIDENTIFIED

I th i nk that might be
" : r: : 2 •

SPEAKER: Let m e see I£ ~

find h ^ r .
T
Ms.

u ready on. this o n e ,

Laycock?
MS.

LAYCOCK: We

THE COURT: Okay, you may proceed.

Call

your first w i t n e s s .
Thank you, your Honor.

We'd

call Deputy K n o w l e s .
know
••-he Pt^te i;o^ another witness.
would

invoke the exclusionat
rr%r%r.r

MS,

4- K ^ +-

LAYCOCK:

matters.

Ari f a r iv; 1 k n o w

'

mi ill II i

THE COURT: Okay.
your right hand.
,-,il li

t tit-

w« a u n - u .

) J 11,"

Do you want

raise

II
.

.

t !,,,•
.

COURT CLERK: You Ju Lulemnly

, ,,

swear the
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testimony you shall give in this case now pending
before the Court will be the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Be seated now in this chair,
please.
DAVID KNOWLES,
having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MS. LAYCOCK:
Q.

Would you state your name.

A.

David Knowles.

Q.

And with whom are you employed?

A.

Utah County Sheriff's Department.

Q.

And what do you do in that

A.

I'm a patrol deputy.

Q.

All right, and were you on patrol on

employment?

4/19/96 ?
A.

Yes.

Q.

About 4 in the afternoon where were you

patroll ing?
A.

I was patrolling in the area of Squaw

Peak, near Archery R^ad.
Q.

Okay, and is that in Utah County?

1

A.

I

2

Q*

And did you ever receive?

dispatch regardina
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Deputy Curtis anc

responded
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: up inert'.
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13

A

14

Q
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He was supposedly driving a blue
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10
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Were

In I, lu-i area to check

Deputy Curtis {™

vehicles?
e.
right, and w h e n you responded

I

that

area w h a t did you find?
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*~ ve were

Archery Road

coming up on the firs
matched
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the

~ upon

seeing

vehicle?
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6

what I saw.
in.

He was directly behind me.

We pulled

I pulled in right behind the vehicle.
Q.

Did you have lights flashing or anything?

A.

No.

Q.

All right.

What did you do when you

pulled in behind them?
A.

As I was pulling in behind them I observed

the driver making furtive movements with his left
hand.

It looked as though he was doing something

with his left hand at the bottom of his seat.
Q.

So what did you do?

A.

I stopped my vehicle.

An individual got

out and walked around the car and
Q.

—

Was that the driver that you're talking

about?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

I observed him throw something, a metallic

object /

Go on.

about 13 or 14 feet away into a wooded

area.
Q.

And how far were you from him at that

point?
A.

I was approximately 25 feet away.

Q.

Okay.

So what did you do after you saw

him throw the metallic object?

Il
'• 1
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3

this perso 1

4

P
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C
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No.
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item?
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After
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After the person
that

person

threw

do?

threw the item Deputy Curtis

would you say the person you saw throw

13

the item was the same person that Deputy

14

approached?

15

p a 11

Il I" > e l i e v e

so

3

(inaudible).

von stated tha^i

was

actually Deputy Curtis that w e n t out
?
19
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Q.

Uh-huh.
^

tated that w h i l e he was looking

you w e r e observing what Deputy Curtis w a s doing.
2 2|
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! Il"
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II

'"hrown the item, at this
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time?

JurLiL. handcuffed h i m .
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Q.

When Deputy Curtis located this item and

brought it back, did either you or Deputy Curtis
confront him with the item and ask him if it was
his or if he'd thrown it?
A.

I believe Deputy Curtis did.

Q.

And do you recall what the response that

this person might have given?
A.

I can't testify.

I didn't hear what his

response was.
Q.

Okay.

Now, you testified that at some

point in time you asked the passengers to place
their hands where you could see them.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

At what point in time did you decide it

was appropriate to have them exit the vehicle?
A.

When I saw the open container of alcohol.

Q.

Okay, and as he exited the vehicle did you

do the Terry frisk of those individuals?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did Deputy Curtis help you do this or

were you acting alone in searching the individuals?
A.

I don't recall.

I believe he assisted.

can't remember.
Q.

Did you locate any items of paraphernalia

or weapons on any of these individuals?

I

x^
1

A,

I

2]

Q.

And you stated toe i*"em w h i c h you

believed

alcoholic beverage w a s ±u ^xx^ wd^A seat.

tw ~w
41

A.
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before you asked

the

:i t: was open?
£

could.

C

i n d i v i d u a l s exited did you

double-check

if that indeed w a s an alcoholic

A
AI1U

U

ve stated t h a t you b e g a n %.u

ictually w h a t h a p p e n e d w a s w h e n

inside the v e h i c l e
marijuana.
2

i

smelled the s t r o n g odor ol

After thau x p r o c e e d e d w i t h the search.

()] :aj

When ynv

p r o c e e d e d +-o s e a r c h what

exactly were yo\ i 111 ooking for, _,^u you k n o w , or did
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I was looking tor m a r i j u a n a , further opei i

containers.
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Q.

Did you ask permission

people there whether you could

of any of the
search the

A.

I don't recall.

I don't believe

Q.

You stated that

in searching the

vehicle?
so.
vehicle

you began to focus on what you label as a pocket
the driver's door; is that

right?

A.

That's

Q.

And within that pocket you stated

located
A.

on

correct.

-- you called

it a Camel

Yeah, I believe first

you

buck.

I found a pack of

Zig-Zag p a p e r s , rolling papers commonly

used

for

smoking marijuana.
Q.
you

for,
and

Okay, but in addition you found

labe led a Camel buck; is that

something

right?

A.

That's

correct.

Q.

Okay.

What

A.

A Camel buck is -- I'm not sure what

is a Camel

buck?

but it comes on the back of Camel
they have some kind of monetary
Q.

Okay.

So in other words

cigarettes

value.

it's some

of paper that's associated with the Camel

piece

brand?

A.

Right, a rectangular piece of p a p e r .

Q.

Okay, and when you found that

unrolled
A.

it's

item

it or was it folded up or how was
It was folded up with something

you
it?

inside.

1

Q. c
4

2

unfolded

2.

white powder
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substance that

elieved

.ike

methamphetamine.
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tested.
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Q1. Dii d y om it, < * \ > e:i : confront either Mr. Peterson
anyone else a t t:he scene a

13
14

that item was (inaudible) either the Camel buck or

15

the item found within the Camel buck?
A

17

response

U1

19
20

individuals

Blake Petersoii s response was that _^
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Q.

Did you ever confront either Mr* Peterson

or anyone else in the car about the Zig-Zag papers
that you had found?
A.

Again, I don't recall if I confronted them

anyone about them.
Q.

Did anyone who was present at the scene,

did either Mr. Peterson or anyone else admit to
drug usage or drug possession at the time?
A.

Yes, one of the individuals admitted to

smoking some marijuana.

If you'd like I can read

that.
Q.

If you'll just state the individual's

name, if you can find it.
A.

I have here that Jeffrey admitted that

they had been smoking marijuana.
Q.

Did anyone else?

A.

I don't believe so.

Q.

Did Mr. Peterson make any statements

regarding either drug usage or possession while you
were there at the scene?
A.

I believe all of his statements were that

he had not used any drugs and that he was not in
possession of any.
Q.

And all of these statements were made

after he'd already been handcuffed by Deputy

Cur Lis?

21

A.

3

. Q.

Yes.
And had either you

Deputy Curtis

I
5
6

A.

don u M I U W

71
8

I did not advise him

Q.

: > F h i s rights.

I

ii Deputy Curtis did.

Did you ever fingerprint the item which

you' •< described ,„ - pipe that's here today -..

I

10

under

order was

fingerprinted.

Ill
12
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13
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As t o

the

disposition

of

'tiie

individuals,

rrested?
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of

Brad

there?

A.

Brad?

I believe

Q

Okay.

Was h e
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believe —

I think Deputy Curtis searched Brad.

Q.

Did he hr /e a valid driver's license?

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Is there a reason why you didn't allow

Brad to drive the car and take it home, as opposed
to arresting him?
A.

Brad was charged.

He was not just taken

into custody and then turned over to his parents.
He was being charged.

Our option was to take him

to juvenile detention, cite and release him or call
his parents and leave him in their custody.

We

opted to take him and leave him in his parents'
custody.
Q.

What was it you were going to charge him

A.

Possession of paraphernalia,

with?
(inaudible)

an open container.
Q.

But you stated that he didn't have any

paraphernalia on him.
A.

I didn't state that.

Q.

Oh, that's correct.

Deputy Curtis

(inaudible).

I said -You stated that

Which paraphernalia

item were you alleging that was involved with him?
A.

Well, possibly the paraphernalia that

Mr. Peterson threw —

Blake Peterson threw.

Q.
havirr

£ i in 1
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cowed?

3

A.

An inventory
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Q.
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v^s done.
^nv other items that were

alleged

cither contraband

paraphernalia
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A.

Not
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Did you take any written statements
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cnowledge.

.,

(

. viduals present at the

irom

time?
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time?
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or a video
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.JEWELL: I d o n ' t h a v e a n y fur t h e r

questions of this witness, your
!
T'U

recorder?
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MS. LAYCOCK: Y e s .

Honor.

26

REDIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MS, LAYCOCK:
Q.

When you pulled into what you call the

(inaudi ble) I believe you indicated that you were
right b ehind the defendant's car.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

All right, and that you were bl ocking an

A.

There's only one way in and one way out.

exit.

He was parked in the middle of the road on the way
in.

I pulled in directly behind him.
Q.

Okay.

Where did that road go?

A.

It just goes to a little campin g spot.

Q.

Is this a legal camping spot?

A.

I believe so.

Q.

So is pulling in behind him the only way

that you could get close to him?
A.

Yes.
MS. LAYCOCK: Okay, thank you.

I have

nothing further.
THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: You may step down.
witnesses for the State?
MS. LAYCOCK: No, we'd rest.

Any other

r

y itnesses for t he defense?

:,•:-. MR. JEWELL: No, youi Honor, unless Deputy
Curtis has arrived.
THE COURT: Any argument, Counsel?
5

MS. LAYCOCK: No, your Honor.

6

a

7

MR. JEWEL!"

8

in
:

State's burden,

they're not goin^

9

THE COURT: All right

lurpose of this

10

hearing Court finds there's probable cause L O

II Il

1 : >e 1 :i • =

12

committed and that this defendant committed those

13

charges.

14

= thc > t: th = ::::>ffenses as charged have been

State's Exhibi' "

15

objection *

16

being withdrawn

MR. JEWELL
I

~ assume there's

THE COURT:

*.

your donor.
? r^

r-

tzhdrawn.

Is the

this time
19
20

MR. JEWELL
Kf

Bainum's
^

22

:ria

However, Mr. Bainum probablv
*iar*

nas to set the

- * at Court prefers, we can just
entry n

THE COURT: Okay.
25

oner, actually thir

... . . ~~Lofcer with *,..-

plea
We'll
I.»

later date.
ne-i to

*

Luc

« > • LLe matter,

28
then, for arraignment for the 4th of October at
8 a.m.

Defendant is ordered to be present at that

time.
(Hearing concluded)
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*511 The state suggests that an otherwise
innocuous object, i.e., a roll of paper towels,
becomes "clearly incriminating" by virtue of an act
of concealment or "furtive movement." Such
movements are certainly relevant in establishing
probable cause to associate an object with criminal
activity. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1904-05, 20 L.Ed.2d 917
(1968) ("[Deliberately furtive actions and flight at
the approach of strangers or law officers are strong
indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the
suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper
factors to be considered in the decision to make an
arrest."). Following Sibron, other jurisdictions have
held that furtive movements or gestures alone are
insufficient to constitute probable cause for search or
arrest. See, e.g., State v. Sabartinelli, 23 Ariz.App.
436, 533 P.2d 1173, 1177 (1975); People v. Cassel,
23 Cal.App.3d 715, 100 Cal.Rptr. 520, 523 (1972);
People v. Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 664, 665
(1974); People v. Collins, 53 111.App.3d 253, 11
Ill.Dec. 399, 401, 368 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 10 Mass. App.Ct.
613, 411 N.E.2d 477, 480 n. 2 (1980); People v.
Robinson, 71 Mich.App. 287, 248 N.W.2d 237, 238
(1976); State v. Braxton, 90 N.C.App. 204, 368
S.E.2d 56, 58 (1988); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d
177, 524 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1988),cm. denied, 488
U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 264, 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988);
State v. Flores, 58 Or.App. 437, 648 P.2d 1328,
1330 (1982); Smith v. State, 542 S.W.2d 420, 422
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976). See generally Annotation,
Search & Seizure: "Furtive" Movement or Gesture
as Justifying Police Search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581 (1972)

potential for misunderstanding in such a situation is
obvious.
91 Cal.Rptr. at 735, 478 P.2d at 455. Thus, other
factors must be shown which, in the totality of the
circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent
person to believe that there is evidence of criminal
activity.
[8] All we have in this case is defendant's attempt
to stuff the roll of paper towels down between the
car seat and the console. (FN5) There is nothing
else to suggest that the item was associated with
criminal activity, not even a subtle connection
between the item and the suspected prostitution deal.
We hold that the furtive movement *512. standing
alone, was insufficient to establish the requisite
probable cause to make the roll of paper towels
"clearly incriminating."
Since neither the plain
view exception nor any other exception is available
to justify the officer's search, the search is
unreasonable per se. (FN6)
Any evidence
subsequently seized was inadmissible as a derivative
of that illegal search and may not be used against
defendant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963; State v.
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983).
We conclude that the trial court erred in denying
defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant's
conviction for attempted possession of a controlled
substance is reversed, and the case is remanded to
the trial court for such further proceedings as may
be appropriate.
GREEN WOO!), J., concurs.

The rationale behind this rule is articulated by the
court in People v. Superior Court of Yolo County 3
Cal.3d 807, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449 (1970):
[F]rom the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent
gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty
movement. He must not only perceive the gesture
accurately, he must also interpret it in accordance
with the actor's true intent. But if words are not
infrequently ambiguous, gestures are even more
so. Many are wholly nonspecific, and can be
assigned a meaning only in their context. Yet the
observer may view that context quite otherwise
from the actor: not only is his vantage point
different, he may even have approached the scene
with a preconceived notion-consciously or
subconsciously-of what gestures he expected to
see and what he expected them to mean. The

BILLINGS, J., concurs in the result.
FN1. Defendant urges us to impose a more rigorous
test under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution to determine what constitutes
reasonable suspicion. However, she offers no
justification for doing so. This is an insufficient
basis for us to analyze state constitutional issues
and we decline to do so See State v. Arroyo, 770
P.2d 153, 154 n. 1 (Utah App. 1989). Our analysis
is thus limited to the protections afforded under the
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.
MN2. In addition to the factors listed by defendant,
the state also asserts three other factors justifying
the motor vehicle stop: "defendant looking back
toward traffic;"
"defendant's actions fit the
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normal scenario of prostitutes on State Street;"
and
"[the officer's]
experience
in vice
enforcement"
FN3. We decline, however, to expand the pretextual
traffic stop analysis c Sierra to the facts of this
case.
FN4. "Distinctive configuration" is a variation of the
plain view exception providing that certain
containers "cannot support any reasonable
expectation of privacy because their contents can
be inferred from their outward appearance." Cole,
674 P.2d at 124 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 764 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593 0 13,
61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979)).
FN5. When the arresting officer asked defendant for
the roll of paper towels, she denied it was hers.
The state points out that if defendant's disclaimer
of ownership were truly credible, she would have
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the roll of
paper towels and thus no standing to contest the
validity of the search. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387
(1978);
State v. Void 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah
1984);
State v. Laroc 742 P.2d 89 (Utah
App.1987). In making its ruling on the evidence,
the trial court here necessarily determined that
standing was not at issue. We note that a mere
disclaimer of ownership in the context of a police

query is insufficient in itself to make such an
assertion.
Accord State v. Al 93 Wash.2d
170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) (since the
evidence was found on defendant's person and was
to be used against him, there was no question that
defendant had standing to contest the search).
FN6. In view of our holding on probable cause
under the clearly incriminating prong of the plain
view exception, we need not examine the search
under the "automobile exception" established in
Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct.
280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) Carroll held "a search
warrant unnecessary where there is probable cause
to search an automobile stopped on the highway;
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and
the car's contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained. Hence an immediate
search is constitutionally permissible." Chambers
v. Maroney 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975,
1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). See also California
v. Carney All U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85
L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (warrantless search of vehicle
justified where there is probable cause, vehicle is
mobile, and there is a reduced expectation of
privacy); United States v. Rot 456 U.S. 798,
102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (police
having probable cause to conduct warrantless
search of a vehicle may search any container inside
which may conceal object of searcl State v.
Limb, 581 P 2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978).
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